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Non-technical summary
To combat global warming several European countries have introduced carbon taxes. The
latter imply a shift in comparative advantage, depending on the level of the carbon tax and the
degree to which various industries differ in terms of emission intensity. There has been
extensive empirical work on the economic adjustment induced by environmental taxes in
open economies under the assumptions of constant unit costs and perfect competition. What
has been largely ignored, however, is that these shifts in comparative advantage may be
significantly reinforced under imperfect competition where changes in market structure affect
both production costs as well as markup rates. Under conditions of imperfect competition
with free entry and exit, the number and size of firms and, hence, their ability to exploit
economies of scale depend on the elasticity of market demand. If market demand is composed
of domestic demand and export demand, each characterized by a different demand elasticity,
the elasticity of total market demand will depend on the shares of domestic sales and sales
abroad. To the extent that environmental taxes lead to a shift in comparative advantage, these
shares will change, and so will firm size and unit costs, i.e. economies of scale.
This paper uses a multi-sector computable general equilibrium model for Germany to
examine the impacts of a unilateral national carbon tax under both perfect and imperfect
competition on goods markets. Under imperfect competition, we find that economies of scale
decline in industries which lose comparative advantage, whereas economies of scale increase
in industries whose comparative advantage improves. The key to these results is the empirical
evidence that the elasticity of demand is typically higher for sales abroad than for sales in
domestic markets. As a consequence of induced changes in the economies of scale, the degree
of structural change is larger under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At
the macroeconomic level, the costs of environmental regulation under imperfect competition
turn out to be higher than under perfect competition for the German economy, because on the
whole the changes in economies of scale across imperfectly competitive sectors are negative.
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Abstract
The economic effects of environmental taxes depend on the market structure. Under imperfect
competition with free entry and exit, environmental taxes have an impact on economies of
scale by changing the number and size of firms. Whether economies of scale rise or fall in a
particular industry depends on induced changes in the price elasticity of demand. Because
export demand is more price elastic than domestic demand, the overall price elasticity rises
(falls) as the industry gains (loses) in comparative advantage. We use a computable general
equilibrium model for Germany to examine the effects of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax
under both perfect and imperfect competition. Our key finding is that induced structural
change in favor of the less energy intensive, more labor intensive industries is more
pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the
macroeconomic level, the total costs of environmental regulation under imperfect competition
can be higher or lower than those under perfect competition depending on whether aggregate
gains or losses in economies of scale across imperfectly competitive sectors prevail.
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11. Introduction
For decades, the theory of environmental policy has recommended environmental taxes, or
likewise tradable emission permits, on the grounds that they provide a cost-effective means of
environmental regulation. In view of the need to combat global warming and the relative ease
of designing an appropriate tax scheme for CO2 as the most important greenhouse gas,
environmental taxes have recently become popular in the political arena, too. Several
European countries have introduced environmentally motivated taxes on energy, but most of
these tax initiatives deviate from the basic principles of environmental taxation in various
regards. In addition to not being based on the carbon content of different energy carriers, tax
schemes typically involve reduced tax rates or tax exemptions for industries that are energy
intensive and/or export-oriented. The motivation for this type of unequal treatment is the
intention of protecting these industries against a loss in 'international competitiveness' (see
e.g. Böhringer and Rutherford 1997).
From a theoretical perspective, it is evident that a tax strictly in proportion to
emissions implies a shift in comparative advantage, depending on the degree to which several
industries differ in terms of emission intensity. What has been largely ignored, however, is
that these shifts in comparative advantage may be significantly reinforced under imperfect
competition where changes in market structure affect both production costs as well as markup
rates. Under conditions of imperfect competition with free entry and exit, the number and size
of firms and, hence, their ability to exploit economies of scale depend on the elasticity of
market demand. If market demand is composed of domestic demand and export demand, each
characterized by a different demand elasticity, the elasticity of total market demand will
depend on the shares of domestic sales and sales abroad. To the extent that environmental
taxes lead to a shift in comparative advantage, these shares will change, and so will firm size
and unit costs, i.e. economies of scale.
This paper uses a multi-sector computable general equilibrium model for Germany to
examine the impacts of a unilateral national carbon tax under both perfect and imperfect
competition on goods markets. Under imperfect competition, we find that economies of scale
decline in industries which lose comparative advantage, whereas economies of scale increase
in industries whose comparative advantage improves. The key to these results is the empirical
2evidence that the elasticity of demand is typically higher for sales abroad than for sales in
domestic markets (Burniaux et al. 1992).1
As a consequence of induced changes in the economies of scale, the degree of
structural change is larger under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the
macroeconomic level, the costs of environmental regulation under imperfect competition turn
out to be higher than under perfect competition for the German economy, because on the
whole the changes in economies of scale across imperfectly competitive sectors are negative.
Given that any assessment of the structural effects of environmental taxes in open
economies is crucially affected by market structure and the induced changes thereof, it is
surprising that the literature seems to have largely ignored the impact of environmental taxes
on market structure. Whereas general equilibrium models with scale economies and
endogenous market structure are standard tools in the analysis of trade policy (see, e.g., Harris
1984, Norman, Branson and Winters 1990, Capros, Karadeloglou and Mentzas 1991,
Willenbockel 1994), environmental economics has mostly addressed market structure in a
partial-equilibrium framework (see, e.g., the contributions in Carraro, Katsoulacos and
Xepapadeas 1996), which, by definition, does not allow the analysis of structural change. An
early environmentally-oriented computable general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition on good markets is presented by Conrad and Wang (1993), but in this model, as
in the partial equilibrium models, firm numbers and scale economies are fixed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical overview of our
analytical framework. Section 3 presents the simulation results and their economic
interpretation. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 General Framework
This section presents the main characteristics of our comparative static multi-sector
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the German economy, which is designed to
assess the medium-run effects of carbon/environmental taxes on trade and industrial structure
                                                          
1 Unlike the elasticity on the export market, the elasticity on the domestic market is derived from production and
consumption elasticities which are typically less than one. See, e.g., Burniaux et al. (1992).
3(see Appendix 1 for an algebraic model formulation). The analysis covers 13 sectors and 3
primary factors as described in Table 1. The sectoral aggregation captures key dimensions in
the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement, such as differences in carbon intensities and the
degree of substitutability across energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The
energy goods identified in the model are hard coal (HCO), lignite (SCO), crude and refined
oil (OIL), natural and manufactured gases (GAS) and electricity and steam (ELE). The non-
energy sectors include important carbon-intensive and energy-intensive industries that are
potentially most affected by carbon abatement policies, such as basic materials and chemical
products (MMC), investment goods (EQP) and transport (TRN). The rest of the economy is
divided into agricultural production (AGR), consumption goods (CSG), construction (CST),
private services (SER) and public services (PUB ). Primary factors include labor (LAB),
capital (CAP) and fossil-fuel resources (RES). Labor and capital are treated as perfectly
mobile across sectors whereas fossil-fuel resources are sector-specific. Factor markets are
treated as perfectly competitive.
Table 1: Sectors and primary factors in the general equilibrium model for Germany
Commodities Primary factors
AGR Agricultural goods CAP Capital
MMC Basic materials / chemical products LAB Labor
EQP Investment goods RES Sector-specific resource
CSG Consumption goods
CST Construction
TRN Transport
SER Private services
PUB Public services
HCO Hard coal
SCO Lignite
OIL Crude oil and refined oil products
GAS Natural and manufactured gases
ELE Electricity and steam
Production
Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions are employed to specify the
substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material
(non-energy) intermediate inputs.
FOS     Fossil fuels
4Figure 1 illustrates the nesting structure employed for production sectors other than
fossil fuels and electricity. Output is produced with fixed-coefficient (Leontief) inputs of
intermediate non-energy goods and an aggregate of energy and a value added composite. The
value-added composite consists of a CES aggregation of capital and labor. The energy
aggregate is, in turn, produced with a CES function of electricity and a composite of primary
energy inputs. The primary energy composite is then defined as a CES function of a CES
aggregate of hard coal and lignite and a CES aggregate of refined oil and natural gas. In the
production of electricity, the primary energy composite is defined as a CES function of oil
and an aggregate of coal and gas. The coal-gas composite is a CES function of gas and a CES
aggregate of hard coal and lignite. In the production of fossil fuels, labor, capital and fossil
fuel inputs are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this
aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant elasticity of
substitution. The latter is calibrated in consistency with exogenously given price elasticities of
fossil fuel supplies.
Figure 1: Structure of production
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5The model allows for perfect as well as imperfect competition on good markets.
Imperfect competition due to fixed costs is modeled as a Cournot oligopoly with free market
entry/exit, i.e. each domestic industry consists of identical firms, whose number is determined
by the zero profit condition in conjunction with fixed costs and free market entry/exit (see
section 2.2 and Appendix 2).
Private demand, government and investment demand
Private demand for goods and services is derived from utility maximization of a
representative household subject to a budget constraint. Total income of the representative
household consists of factor income and transfers. Utility is derived from real consumption
and savings. The top level of the utility function is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function
resulting in a constant savings rate. Real consumption of the representative agent is a CES
composite of an energy aggregate and a Cobb-Douglas non-energy composite. The energy
composite is defined as a CES function of electricity and the primary energy composite. The
primary energy composite is given as a CES function of hard coal, lignite and a CES
aggregate of oil and gas. The structure of final demand is given in Figure 2.
Government and investment demand is fixed exogenously. The public good consists of
intermediate inputs in fixed proportions, the investment good is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of
intermediate inputs.
Figure 2: Nesting structure for final demand
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6International trade
All goods are traded internationally. According to Armington (1969), foreign trade modeling
involves international product differentiation in the sense that imported and domestically
produced goods of the same kind are treated as incomplete substitutes. For each product
variety (Armington aggregate) the substitution possibility between the domestically produced
good and the world import good is described by a CES function. The world import goods, in
turn, are given as a CES aggregate of exports from Germany and exports from the rest of the
world (ROW). The ROW closure requires that the value of imports to ROW are equal to the
value of exports from ROW after including a constant benchmark trade surplus (deficit).
Exports from ROW are determined by an export supply function. An endogenous exchange
rate assures that demand equals supply for ROW exports.
2.2 Market Structure
Starting with the seminal work by Krugman (1979), theoretical and empirical work in the
field of international trade has increasingly adopted scale economies and imperfect
competition as a standard framework(for an overview see Helpman and Krugman 1985). By
contrast, international aspects of environmental policy have mostly been examined under the
more traditional assumptions of constant unit costs and perfect competition (see, e.g., Felder
and Rutherford 1993, Pezzey 1992, Oliveira-Martins, Burniaux and Martin 1992, Manne and
Oliveira-Martins 1994, Welsch 1996, Harrison and Rutherford 1999, Bernstein et al. 1999,
Conrad and Schmidt 1998, Böhringer 2000).
Within the general framework described in section 2.1, each sector can deliberately be
modeled as being perfectly or imperfectly competitive. Imperfect competition, if present, is
due to fixed costs, not to regulation of entry. In the presence of fixed costs; the number of
firms is determined by the usual zero-profit condition.
There are several ways in which imperfect competition can be specified. In the case of
monopolistic competition (Krugman 1979), there are several incompletely substitutable
varieties of each good, and each firm in a particular industry supplies exactly one variety.
Since the elasticity of substitution is the same for all pairs of varieties, there is no
differentiation between domestic and foreign suppliers.
In contrast to this assumption, we choose a set-up in which varieties from the same
country of origin are closer substitutes for each other than are varieties from different
countries. This is in the spirit of Armington (1969), who introduced the theory of demand for
7goods distinguished by place of production. More specifically, we assume that all domestic
varieties are perfect substitutes for each other, as are all foreign varieties, but that domestic
and foreign varieties are incomplete substitutes. This specification avoids the difficulty of
selecting intra-country elasticities of substitution; the inter-country (Armington) elasticities
are available from econometric estimation or literature search (see Appendix 3).
In the presence of fixed costs, the chosen set-up implies that domestic suppliers form a
Cournot oligopoly. The market demand facing these suppliers reflects the fact that domestic
varieties compete with incompletely substitutable varieties from abroad. As usual in Cournot
oligopoly, prices are a markup over marginal costs, where the markup rate reflects the number
of firms and the elasticity of market demand (see Appendix 2).
With respect to the demand elasticity, it should be observed that market demand is the
sum of several demand categories: intermediate demand from the various production sectors,
consumption demand, investment demand, and export demand. The price elasticity of market
demand is the weighted average of the elasticities of the individual demand categories, each
weighted with the corresponding value share. As environmental taxes affect these shares, the
elasticity of market demand is also affected, as are the markup rates. If the elasticity of market
demand rises, the markup drops and firms are driven out of the market. As a consequence,
economies of scale become effective, and both unit costs and prices fall. The reverse happens
if the value shares change in such a way that the overall demand elasticity gets reduced (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3: Cost curves under imperfect competition due to fixed costs
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82.3 Data and Parameterization
Benchmark data are used to calibrate parameters of the functional forms from a given set of
quantities, prices and elasticities. Data from two different sources are combined to yield a
consistent benchmark data set for 1995:
• EUROSTAT Input-Output-Table for Germany with 25 sectors (Beutel 1999, EUROSTAT
1999).
• IEA energy balances and energy prices/taxes (IEA 1999). IEA provides statistics on
physical energy flows and energy prices for industrial and household demands.
The information from IEA energy balances and energy prices is used to split up the aggregate
energy sector, as given in EUROSTAT's input-output table for Germany, into the 5 energy
sectors described above. Our choice of elasticities is mostly based on reviews of the relevant
literature (see, e.g. Burniaux et al. 1992). The Armington elasticities between domestic output
and imports have been estimated on time series data from the 'NEW CRONOS' databank of
EUROSTAT (for details, see Böhringer et al. 2000).
Estimates of markup rates in various industries can be found in Capros et al. (1997).
These estimates suggest that, in terms of our sectoral classification, imperfect competition can
be taken to prevail in the sectors 'basic materials and chemicals' (MMC) and 'investment
goods' (EQP). The markup rates determine the share of fixed costs in total costs. Fixed costs
are treated as part of capital costs. Appendix 3 provides a summary of key elasticities and the
markup rates employed for our simulations.
3. Simulation Results
Our simulations refer to a uniform tax on carbon dioxide that is unilaterally introduced in
Germany to achieve the country's declared target of reducing its carbon emissions until 2005
by 25 percent as compared to 1990 emission levels (Bundesregierung 2000). Since BaU
(Business as Usual) emissions in 2005 are projected to be 14 percent below 1990 levels (see
European Commission 1999), this target implies an effective abatement requirement of 11
percent below BaU. The revenue from the carbon tax is redistributed to private households in
a lump-sum fashion. Simulations have been performed under several assumptions concerning
market structure. We contrast a scenario in which we assume perfect competition on all
9markets (scenario PC) with a scenario where the sectors MMC and EQP are imperfectly
competitive (scenario IC). The effects arising in the latter scenario are decomposed into the
contributions of each of the two imperfectly competitive sectors (scenarios IC_MMC and
IC_EQP).
3.1 Macroeconomic Effects
Table 2 shows the required rate of the carbon tax and the induced percentage changes in
macroeconomic indicators as compared to the benchmark level. In the case of all markets
being perfectly competitive (column PC) the tax rate is around 36 ECU per ton of CO2. The
reduced utilization of fossil fuels leads to a reduction of welfare (measured as Hicksian
equivalent variation HEV in income) by less than 0.1 percent and of GDP by one fourth
percent. Wages and rental rates are almost 1.7 percent below BaU, indicating that reduced
energy input implies a considerable drop in factor productivity at the given employment level.
Table 2: Carbon tax and macroeconomic effects (percentage change)
PC IC_MMC IC_EQP IC
Welfare (HEV) -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 -0.09
GDP -0.24 -0.30 -0.20 -0.26
Consumption -0.41 -0.47 -0.39 -0.44
Investment 0.98 0.88 1.03 0.95
Wage rate -1.69 -1.80 -1.60 -1.69
Rental rate -1.66 -1.60 -1.72 -1.67
Exchange rate -0.90 -0.83 -0.92 -0.85
Carbon tax* 35.64 35.20 35.66 35.20
*   in ECU95 per ton of CO2
The total costs of carbon abatement under imperfect competition can be higher or
lower than those under perfect competition depending on whether aggregate gains or losses in
economies of scale across imperfectly competitive sectors prevail. Under imperfect
competition (IC), environmental taxes have implications for the number and size of firms and,
hence, for their ability to exploit economies of scale. For reasons explained below, carbon
taxes reduce economies of scale in the MMC sector and hence exacerbate the "competitive"
costs of carbon abatement. The reverse is true for imperfect competition in the EQP sector.
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On the whole - with imperfect competition in both sectors - the macroeconomic effects of
carbon taxes for the German economy are slightly more unfavorable compared to the
competitive case because the negative effect in the MMC sector dominates the positive effect
in the EQP sector.
3.2 Sectoral Effects under Perfect Competition
Even though the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxation under imperfect competition do
not differ much from those under perfect competition, the effects on the sectoral level show a
substantial difference across the market structures. Consider first the perfect competition case.
As displayed in Table 3, the suppliers of fossil fuels and the electricity industry are facing a
substantial decline in output. Other negatively affected sectors are agriculture, basic materials
and transport, all of them rather energy intensive. On the other hand, consumption goods,
construction, and private and public services experience a small increase; the investment
goods industry has a rather significant expansion of output.
The sectoral effects are determined by the various industries' factor intensities (see
Appendix 3). Especially, sectors with a high energy/labor ratio (EQP, CST, SER, PUB) are
losers of structural change, whereas those with a low energy/labor ratio (AGR, FOS, ELE,
MMC, TRN) benefit from the change in the ratio of wages to energy costs. These
relationships are consistent with standard factor endowment models in which emissions
represent the factor input "environment": The imposition of an environmental tax on
emissions increases the price of the factor "environment". Consequently, less of this factor
will be used. The production of the "dirty" goods, which use the environment intensively, will
therefore decrease, and that of the environmentally friendly, i.e., capital/labor intensive good
will increase. Previous simulation studies in perfect competition settings have typically been
in line with this logic and produced results very similar to ours: Basic industries of outward
oriented economies experience losses, whereas other manufacturing sectors tend to gain.2
On the international level, these changes in the cost structure translate into changes in
comparative advantage. As shown in Table 4, any increase (or decrease) in output goes along
with an increase (decrease) in exports. Note that the changes in exports are more pronounced
than the corresponding changes in output. For instance, exports of investment goods rise by 3
percent, whereas total output increases not more than 1.4 percent. Exports of basic materials
                                                          
2 For a review of the standard (perfect competition) factor endowment approach to environmental taxes,
production and trade as well as of simulation results obtained in this framework see Klepper (1998).
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and chemicals, conversely, drop by almost 10 percent, whereas output drops by only about 3.6
percent. The reason for these results is that the price elasticity of export demand is larger than
the price elasticity of the various categories of domestic demand.
Table 3: Change in output (percentage change)
PC IC_MMC IC_EQP IC
AGR -0.56 -0.49 -0.61 -0.56
FOS -14.17 -14.14 -14.18 -14.15
ELE -6.89 -7.05 -6.88 -7.05
MMC -3.64 -5.19 -3.77 -5.45
EQP 1.36 1.60 1.69 2.06
CSG 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.14
CST 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.31
TRN -4.19 -4.03 -4.35 -4.23
SER 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.06
PUB 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
Table 4: Change in exports (percentage change)
PC IC_MMC IC_EQP IC
AGR -4.47 -4.02 -4.68 -4.31
FOS -29.21 -28.93 -29.28 -29.01
ELE -46.40 -45.56 -46.53 -45.70
MMC -9.69 -13.69 -10.15 -14.54
EQP 3.01 3.78 3.71 4.78
CSG 0.42 1.10 0.02 0.59
CST 2.18 3.25 1.58 2.49
TRN -14.68 -13.11 -15.46 -14.04
SER 6.62 7.73 6.27 7.27
PUB 6.99 8.92 5.89 7.58
3.3 Sectoral Effects under Imperfect Competition
With respect to the structure of trade, environmental taxes lead to a change in comparative
advantage. This is true irrespective of the market structure. Under imperfect competition,
however, the change in comparative advantage has implications for market structure: With
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free entry and exit, the number of firms in a particular industry is inversely related to the price
elasticity of market demand. A gain in an industry's comparative advantage leads to a shift in
sales from the domestic markets to the export markets. Given that the price elasticity of export
demand is larger than the price elasticity of domestic demand, this implies a rising overall
price elasticity, with an increase in scale economies. The reverse happens if an industry faces
a loss in comparative advantage.
These effects are illustrated in Table 5 and Table 6. If imperfect competition is
restricted to the basic materials/chemicals industry (IC_MMC), the overall demand elasticity
of this sector reduces by more than 6.5 percent, and economies of scale (defined as output per
firm) drop by almost 7 percent. In the case of the investment goods industry being imperfectly
competitive (IC_EQP), both its demand elasticity and scale economies rise by about 1.3
percent. In our core scenario, in which both of these industries are imperfectly competitive,
scale economies drop by almost 7.3 percent in the basic materials/chemicals industry, while
rising by 1.7 percent in the investment goods sector.
Table 5: Change in demand elasticities (percentage change)
PC IC_MMC IC_EQP IC
MMC - -6.55 - -7.05
EQP - - 1.35 1.82
Table 6: Change in economies of scale (percentage change)
PC IC_MMC IC_EQP IC
MMC - -6.83 - -7.27
EQP - - 1.26 1.72
The induced changes in economies of scale imply that structural change is more
pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. As shown in Table
3, the drop of basic materials/chemicals output is 50 percent larger if the basic
materials/chemicals and investment goods industries are imperfectly competitive than it is in
the perfect competitive case. Conversely, the increase of investment goods output is
substantially enhanced if these two industries are characterized by imperfect competition.
The effects at the sectoral level explain the macroeconomic outcome described above
(see section 3.1): Rising scale economies in the investment goods industry would imply that
the losses in welfare and GDP decline, relative to the perfect competition case, whereas
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decreasing scale economies in the basic materials/chemicals industry enhance these losses
(see Table 2, columns IC_EQP and IC_MMC). If both sectors are imperfectly competitive
(column IC), the induced efficiency losses in basic materials/chemicals dominate the
efficiency gains in investment goods, and the welfare loss is larger than it is in the perfect
competitive case.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed how the economic effects of environmental taxes depend on the
underlying market structure. Under imperfect competition with free entry and exit,
environmental taxes have an impact on economies of scale by changing the number and size
of firms. Whether economies of scale rise or fall in a particular industry depends on induced
changes in the price elasticity of demand. Because export demand is more price elastic than
domestic demand, the overall price elasticity rises (falls) as the industry gains (loses) in
comparative advantage.
We used a computable general equilibrium model for Germany to contrast the effects
of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax under perfect vis-a-vis imperfect competition.
Irrespective of the market structure, environmental taxes lead to a change in comparative
advantage - industries with a high energy/labor ratio lose and industries with a low
energy/labor ratio gain.
Under imperfect competition, these changes have direct consequences on the
economies of scale in imperfectly competitive sectors. In the case examined, the investment
goods industry (EQP) gains a comparative advantage and, hence, in economies of scale
whereas the reverse applies to the basic material/chemicals industry (MMC). Therefore, the
structural change induced by carbon taxes is more pronounced under imperfect competition as
compared to perfect competition.
At the macroeconomic level, the total costs of carbon abatement under imperfect
competition can be either higher or lower than those under perfect competition, depending on
whether aggregate gains or losses in economies of scale across imperfectly competitive
sectors prevail. In our simulations for Germany, the loss in economies of scale within MMC
dominates the gains within EQP; on the whole the total costs of carbon abatement turn out
slightly higher than under perfect competition.
14
The impact of imperfect competition on the structural change induced by
environmental taxes has so far been little explored. Given that imperfect competition prevails
in various goods markets, our findings suggest that the structural impacts of environmental
taxes may be larger than previously assumed.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Algebraic Model Summary
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for the generic
comparative-static model with perfectly competitive markets (see Appendix 2 for the
extension with respect to the specification of imperfectly competitive good markets). Two
classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium: zero profit conditions and
market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity levels and the latter
determines price levels. In our algebraic exposition, the notation ziΠ  is used to denote the
profit function of sector i where z is the name assigned to the associated production activity.
Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides
compensated demand and supply coefficients (Shephard’s lemma) that appear subsequently in
the market clearance conditions. Table A1 explains the notations for variables and parameters.
Key elasticities are summarized in Table A2. Estimated Armington elasticities are given in
Table A3. Table A4 gives sectoral benchmark capital and energy intensities. Sectoral markup
rates are summarized in Table A5. For the sake of transparency, we do not write down the
explicit functional forms but instead use the acronyms CET (constant elasticity of
transformation), CES (constant elasticity of substitution), CD (Cobb-Douglas) and LT
(Leontief) to indicate the class of functional form in place.
Zero Profit Conditions
Aggregate output:
(A.1) ( )( ), ,  , ,   0Yi i n n N iP LT PA CES PE CES PL PK∈ Π = − =  i V∀ ∈
( ),  , ,   0Yi i i jP CES PR LT PL PK PA Π = − =  i F∀ ∈
Energy aggregation:
(A.2) ( ) ( )( )- , , , , 0Ei i ELE HCO SCO GAS OILPE CES PA CES CES PA PA CES PA PA   Π = =  \i I ELE∀ ∈
( )( )( )- , , , , 0Ei i ELE OIL GAS HCO SCOPE CES PA CES PA CES PA CES PA PA   Π = =  i ELE=
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Armington aggregation:
(A.3) ( ) 2 2, 0A CO COi i i i i= PA - CES P PM P a  = Π −
World import good production:
(A.4) ( ), 0Mi i i = PM - CES PA PFX = Π
Utility production:
(A.5) ( )- , 0U   PU CD PC PINVΠ = =
Investment:
(A.6) ( ), 0INV i i I = PINV - LT PA = ∈Π
Final demand:
(A.7) ( ) ( )( )( ),- , , , , , 0C n n N ELE HCO SCO OIL GAS PC CES CES PA CES PA CES PA PA CES PA PA∈ Π = = 
Market Clearance Conditions
Labor:
(A.8)
Y
i
i
i
L = Y
PL
∂Π
∂∑
Capital:
(A.9)
Y
i
i
i
K = Y
PK
∂Π
∂∑
Natural resources:
(A.10)
Y
f
ff
f
Q    Y  
PR
∂Π
=
∂
Domestic output:
(A.11)
A
i
i i
i
 Y = A
P
∂Π
∂
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Energy aggregate:
(A.12)
Y
i
i i
i
E Y
PE
∂Π
=
∂
World import good:
(A.13)
A
ROWi
i i i
i
M A M
PM
∂Π
= +
∂
Armington aggregate:
(A.14)
Y MC INV
j i
i j i
j i i i i
A Y C INV M
PA PA PA PA
∂Π ∂Π∂Π ∂Π
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑
Private demand:
(A.15)
U
C U
PC
∂Π
=
∂
Investment:
(A.16)
U
INV U
PINV
∂Π
=
∂
Carbon emissions:
(A.17) 22 COi i
i
CO  A a= ⋅∑
ROW closure:
(A.18)
MROW
i
i i
i i
PMINC
PM PFX B
PFX PFX
σ
θ  ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ +  ∑ ∑
Foreign closure (PFX):
(A.19)
MM
i i
i
i i
PM
M
PFX PFX
σ∂Π  
⋅ =  ∂  ∑ ∑
ROWINCROWiM
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Table A1: Sets, activity and price variables, endowments
Sets:
I, i, j Sectors and goods (13 commodities)
E, e Energy goods (HCO, SCO, OIL, GAS and ELE)
N, n Non energy goods
F, f Fossil fuels (HCO, SCO, GAS)
V, v Non fossil fuels
Activity variables:
Yi Aggregate production
Ei Aggregate energy input
Ai Armington aggregate
Mi World import aggregate
ROW
iM ROW import demand
U Household utility
INV Aggregate investment
C Private consumption
Price variables:
Pi Output price
PEi Price of aggregate energy
PAi Price of Armington aggregate
PMi Price of world import aggregate
PFX ROW export and import price
PU Utility price index
PC Price of aggregate household consumption
PINV Price of investment demand
PL Wage rate
PK Price of capital services
PQf Rent from natural resource
PCO2 Price of carbon permit
Endowments:
L Aggregate labor endowment
K Aggregate capital endowment
fQ Endowment of natural resource f
B Balance of payment surplus
2CO Endowment with carbon emission rights
Other parameters:
2CO
ia Carbon coefficient
θi Expenditure share of world import good i
σM ROW export supply elasticity
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Appendix 2: Specification of Imperfect Competition
Each imperfect competitive sector j is modeled as a homogenous Cournot-Oligopoly. The
output price (Pj) is then given as markup on marginal cost (MCj):
(A.20)
1
1
j
j
j j
MC
P
N η
=
−
⋅
,
where ηj is the price elasticity of market demand and Nj the number of firms in the sector.
Because of free market entry, the zero profit condition holds, i. e. the number of firms
changes in such a way that output price equals average cost.
The elasticity of market demand is consisting of the substitution elasticities and value
shares of the different market stages. If several goods Z1, ...,ZN form an aggregate Z, the price
elasticity of good n ∈ (1,...,N) is:
(A.21) ( )1n nη σ θ= ⋅ −
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between the different goods and θn is the value share
of good n, given that the level of the aggregate Z is seen as exogenous. If Z is in contrast a
sub-aggregate in an aggregation hierarchy, one has to consider the price elasticity of Z, which
depends in the same manner on the substitution elasticities and value shares of higher stages.
This logic continues until a stage is reached that is no longer price dependent from the view of
the agents.
In our market hierarchy, there are two of these stages. Domestic output Yi of the good i
competes with imports Mi of the world import good. Both form the Armington aggregate Ai,
whereby the Armington substitution elasticity is denoted as σA and the value share of the
domestic output as sY,A. A portion sD of the Armington good goes to the domestic market with
the price elasticity ηD, whereas a portion sM is sold on the export market (forming the world
import good Mi) with a price elasticity of ηM. The price elasticity on the export market
depends on the substitution elasticity between exports from Germany and ROW exports in the
production of the world import good σM and the value share of the German Armington good
exports in the world import composite sEX,M. The level of the world import aggregate is seen
as exogenous by German firms. The demand elasticity for Yi with regard to the price Pi is then
given as:
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(A.22) , , , ,(1 ) ( (1 ))Y P A Y A D D M M Y A EX Ms s s s sη σ η σ= ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
Important is the last term of equation A.22, which is related to the competition on the
world market. Since the elasticity of substitution on the world market σM is higher than the
substitution elasticity on the domestic market σA, an increased (decreased) share of exports in
total output results in a higher (lower) price elasticity of the good and a lower (higher) markup
on marginal cost. Increasing export orientation thus reduces market power.
Appendix 3: Summary of Key Elasticities and Markup Rates
Table A2: Selected substitution elasticities
Production
Capital-labor-energy vs. intermediates 0
Capital-labor vs. energy 0.6
Capital vs. labor 0.8
Electricity vs. primary energy inputs 0.3
Hard coal and lignite vs. gas and oil 0.5
Hard coal vs. lignite 2
Gas vs. oil 2
Hard coal, lignite and gas vs. oil in electricity production 0.5
Hard coal and lignite vs. gas in electricity production 2
Hard coal vs. lignite in electricity production 3
Consumption
Energy goods vs. non-energy goods 0.5
Electricity vs. primary energy inputs 0.5
Hard coal and lignite vs. oil and gas 0.2
Oil vs. gas 0.3
Non-energy goods vs. non-energy goods 1
Trade
Armington goods and ROW exports in world import good 16
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Table A3: Estimated Armington elasticities for Germany (1979-1991)*
Sector Armington
Elasticity
t-Value
MMC Basic materials / chemical products 2.039 6.908
EQP Investment goods 2.325 3.669
*   Armington elasticities for all other sectors are set equal to 2.
Table A4: Sectoral benchmark capital and energy intensities
Labor intensity Energy intensity Energy/labor ratio
HCO 0.38 0.26 0.67
SCO 0.06 0.44 7.54
OIL 0.07 0.59 8.03
GAS 0.13 0.13 0.97
ELE 0.16 0.26 1.69
AGR 0.14 0.07 0.49
MMC 0.20 0.08 0.42
EQP 0.28 0.02 0.06
TRN 0.48 0.07 0.15
CSG 0.21 0.03 0.13
CST 0.36 0.02 0.07
SER 0.21 0.01 0.05
PUB 0.57 0.01 0.02
Table A5: Sectoral markup rates*
Markup rate
MMC 5.2
EQP 7.1
*   based on Capros et al. (1997)
